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**OPERATIONAL ETHICS IN DECISION MAKING:
A COMMANDER'S CHALLENGE**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

An operational commander has the responsibility for making critical decisions during campaigns and major operations to achieve operational or strategic objectives. These decisions often present the commander ethical challenges. The commander must rely on his operational ethic to resolve any dilemmas prudently and judiciously. The operational ethic synthesizes the mutually supporting, interwoven qualities of **commitment, integrity, humanity, wisdom and moral courage**. This paper examines the operational ethic of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf during the Persian Gulf War. While not a paragon of the operational ethic, this student believes General Schwarzkopf's intent was for an ethical conduct of the war. Future commanders need to be students of history who possess a character comprised of the qualities outlined in this paper.

PREFACE

Commentary on ethical behavior has existed since the beginning of time. Today, people in positions of trust and responsibility are exceptionally susceptible to the critical eyes of the populace. Military leaders are not (nor should they be) an exception to this scrutiny. Commanders are held to the highest ethical standard because they are in the military. The military should represent the ultimate ethical illustration by which democracy can model itself. Unfortunately, as recent examples of lapses of character show, this is not always true. These errors in judgment cast a shadow on the military's ethic in general.

When senior military officers are the ones demonstrating unethical behavior, subordinate personnel become suspicious of their leadership as a whole. As a result, subordinate military personnel often view their leaders self righteously through a lens clouded by a lack of knowledge and appreciation for resultant decisions. The murkiness of the battlefield and the intent of the commander are not considered. One must remember that operational commanders have the difficult challenge of blending ethics into their military responsibilities. This paper focuses on the qualities of the operational ethic. The operational decision making of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf during the Persian Gulf war provides an opportunity to examine these qualities.

INTRODUCTION

Operational leadership is the critical facet of operational art committed to achieving combat power by translating “national or theater-strategic aims and tasks into militarily attainable operational or strategic objectives”.¹ The operational commander has the formidable responsibility for making decisions to affect the stated aims. Conducting war commensurate with a democratic value system requires ethical operational decision making. The commander strives to ensure ethical conduct of war by adhering to international laws of war, core values and customary law. Analysis of operational decisions of past wars provides an impetus for ethical conduct of future wars. The trench warfare of World War I, the indiscriminate bombing of German cities during World War II and the injustices of Vietnam compel operational leaders to bring ethics into the decision making process.

Selection as an operational commander represents the nation’s investment of trust predicated on purity of character. However, the ethical environment becomes less clear and less subject to specific rules or simple solutions as one progresses in rank.² In times of war, the operational commander must use ethical judgment in all but the most mundane decisions.³

The operational commander has at his disposal written guidance in the forms of international law, the laws of war, customary law and military doctrine. Sun Tzu wrote of the role of laws to the commander “Laws are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institution.”⁴ The guidance available is not all inclusive and is subject to prudent application. Regulations concerning the conduct of war exist to “humanize war by balancing

two fundamental and competing values--military necessity (the minimum violence necessary to achieve military goals) and humanity (the protection of innocents during war).⁵ Military core values are conceptual by nature. In times of crisis the commander must rely on his own ethical values to make the right decisions.

The laws of war and a service specific set of published core values cannot be the sole source an operational commander depends on to resolve ethical dilemmas in operational decision making. The commander's operational ethic derives from personal and professional education and experience. The commander relies on this operational ethic for prudent decision making when there is no clearly defined 'right' course of action. The operational ethic synthesizes the mutually supporting, interwoven qualities of **commitment, integrity, humanity, wisdom and moral courage.**

OPERATIONAL ETHIC QUALITIES

Commitment. "A pledge or promise to do something."(Webster's New World Dictionary)

The operational commander commits to the concepts espoused in the oath of office. The commander pledges to support and defend the Constitution including the people and democratic principles inherent in its existence. At the beginning of the Persian Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf said:

"I am a soldier. I took an oath to support and defend the constitution of the United State of America and to obey the orders of my leaders duly appointed over me, and I did this with the knowledge that as military commander I could be asked to go into battle and protect those things that we Americans believe in."⁶

A commander cannot view the oath of office as a mere contract but as a way of life pledged to contribute to the common good of society.⁷

The operational commander has a commitment to national-strategic leaders.

Clausewitz' often quoted reference to war as a political instrument must be the watchwords of every operational commander. It is his job to plan and execute appropriate military action to accomplish the political objective. Frustration with the political system causes even the most dedicated commander to consider quitting. The commander must adhere to his commitment to the mission when faced with this dilemma. After becoming the Commander in Chief Central Command, General Schwarzkopf considered retirement. With the possibility of war on the horizon, his commitment outweighed his hatred of war. His motivation was love of country not glory.⁸

The operational commander commits to the moral, welfare, education and training of subordinates. Dedication develops mutual trust and respect. General Schwarzkopf demonstrated such a commitment to troops during the Gulf War through weekly visits to the field, attempts to properly equip each soldier (e.g. desert boots)⁹ and by his prudent decision to inoculate the soldiers deemed most likely to be exposed to biological weapons rather than those in “critical” billets.¹⁰ It is not clear whether he showed the same commitment to his subordinate commanders. During the Persian Gulf war he directly or indirectly threatened to fire his senior ground commander, his naval commander, his air commanders and both Army Corps commanders.¹¹ Subordinate commanders cannot maximize their effectiveness in such a threatening environment. In a non-attribution lecture at the Naval War College a general stated that a commander should “stand beside those who are making prudent decisions based on resources available if you know them to be of high character and are competent.”

Another equally important commitment of the operational commander is to the coalition. Coalition cohesion and unity of effort depend on leaders committed to a common

goal and to the interests of its members. General Schwarzkopf's commitment to the diverse coalition in the Gulf War established the requisite level of trust for successful execution of operations.

Finally, the commander must commit to the laws of war. After the Persian Gulf war the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said "Decisions were impacted by legal considerations at every level. Lawyers proved invaluable in the decision making process."¹² Regardless of how many lawyers provide interpretation and advice, the responsibility for making ethical decisions resides with the operational commander. General Schwarzkopf's decision to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces after the cease fire was consistent with international law and demonstrated his commitment to the coalition.¹³

Integrity. "The quality or state of being of sound moral principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity". (Webster's New World Dictionary)

The operational commander's decisions are only as sound as his integrity. Integrity is more than discerning right from wrong. It is about deciding what is right and acting on it without concern for self. Thoughts of glory and career advancement have no place on the battlefield nor in the headquarters. If a commander takes the time to weigh personal consequences, he will miss a window of opportunity for action. The commander must place integrity foremost in working with political and military leadership, subordinate commanders and coalition members. By doing so, he lays the foundation for loyalty and trust.

The operational commander must be forthright when advising national-strategic leadership. If use of military force is not the best way to achieve the political objective, he has a moral obligation to say so. When directed to execute military action, he must give an honest assessment of capabilities and resources required. The commander must ensure that

the objectives are clearly stated and achievable. General Schwarzkopf provided the Pentagon an honest assessment regarding the number of troops required for victory in the Gulf War. He accepted the political risk of his refusing pressure from Washington to start the ground campaign until he could guarantee the land forces of sufficient air cover.¹⁴

The operational commander owes his subordinate commanders equal probity and sincerity. His staff requires freedom of action in order to exercise initiative.¹⁵ The commander must listen to all recommendations and make the prudent decision based on this information. He cannot make decisions influenced by service bias or friendship and there can be no decision by committee. Once the decision is made and the objectives made clear, subordinate commanders are responsible for determining how the operation will be executed. General Schwarzkopf's plan in the Persian Gulf War was to use air power to take out the Iraqi's 'eyes' so that the ground flanking maneuver would remain secret. Centralized direction of air operations affected synchronization of attacks designed to prepare the battlefield for ground operations.¹⁶ A bigger problem resulted from his volcanic personality. His propensity to publicly berate his commanders may have inhibited the free thinking of his staff.¹⁷

Coalition warfare requires mutual trust among the coalition members for unity of effort. The first step in building trust is through honesty and sincerity. An operational commander has the premier responsibility for ensuring that all those in his command adhere to this requirement. Forces who are fighting together must trust each other to work cooperatively. One way to enhance coalition unity is the concept of sharing intelligence information. Coalition members do not need to know the source of the information but deserve a view of the intelligence picture.

The operational commander cannot be an ambitious careerist intent on furthering his own interests at great cost to subordinates or the actual mission. "The essential point is and always must be, that a man shall give himself up wholly to a great cause; that he shall not seek to satisfy his vanity and personal advantage."¹⁸

Humanity. "The fact or quality of being humane; kindness, mercy, sympathy, tenderness, etc." (Webster's New World Dictionary)

The international laws of war were developed to make the prosecution of war as humane as possible. The Geneva Laws are characterized by absolute, nonnegotiable prohibitions on certain types of conduct, such as killing prisoners of war. The Hague laws (which regulate the overall means and methods of combat) are vaguely worded, giving military commanders wide latitude to plan and implement battle strategies.¹⁹ The two criteria for *jus in bello* ("war conduct law") -- proportionality of means and discrimination -- are equally subject to the operational commander's prudence. "Justice must be tempered with mercy and that in morally ambiguous situations one should take a gamble on erring on the side of mercy."²⁰

The operational commander faces an ethical challenge in the targeting decision making. The laws of war clearly state that only military targets are legitimate. The intention is never to destroy nations. In the Gulf war, strategic leaders decided that the economic infrastructure of Iraqi society was a legitimate military target: communication and transportation systems, electric power grids, governmental buildings, water pumping stations and purification plants.²¹ The debate over the legitimacy of this decision continues even today, especially when long term health problems associated with the destruction of some facilities are felt by non-combatants. The intended military goal was to disrupt enemy

communications and power thereby causing confusion and chaos. Additionally, the goal was to knock out much of the electricity necessary to run the Iraqi air defense network. Trying to conduct a ‘clean’ war against a ‘dirty’ enemy added to the difficult targeting decision making. Saddam’s tactics in the Gulf War included using command and control centers as civilian shelters, parking combat aircraft near religious and archeological sites, and using civilian convoys as camouflage for mobile Scud launchers.²² These unethical tactics resulted in the unintentional deaths of non-combatants such as those at the Al Fidos bunker. Fighting such an enemy requires a balance between audacity and self control by the commander..

Coalition pilots prosecuting the air war had clear orders concerning deploying weapons against the selected targets. These included returning to base if they could not get a definite fix on the target, no dropping bombs in the general vicinity of the target, no aiming freely at target of opportunity except in specified battle zone and accepting risks for themselves in lieu of risks to civilian.²³ This aiming policy was an honest attempt to prosecute the air war discriminately and humanely. The use of precision guided munitions added an insurance to this policy. Unfortunately, bombs went awry due to weather conditions, some pilots did not adhere to the policy and there was collateral damage. There were also casualties as a result of blue on blue engagements. The intent of the commander, however, was to avoid such collateral damage and fratricide. The fog of the battlefield will never be conducive to producing a zero error rate.

The operational commander faces the difficult decision regarding use of weapons technology in prosecuting the war. Precision bombing and high technology weapons are designed to avoid massive civilian trauma. However the Persian Gulf war was not solely fought with such ‘smart’ weapons. Many of the bombing operations relied on ‘dumb’ bomb

(i.e., Fuel Air Explosives, Napalm, General Purpose Bombs, etc.) resulting in excessive and unnecessary destruction of noncombatant structures, enemy forces and the environment.

Some research also indicates that coalition forces were guilty of excessive application of technology. “In effect, if not in intent, the air war against Iraq was a war against civilians.”²⁴

In a limited war or conflict, the commander is responsible for applying a judicious use of force to achieve the limited aims. General Colin Powell said of the Gulf War, “Even in combat chivalry should reign; compassion should be extended to a prostrate foe.”²⁵ How then can one explain the apparent ‘turkey shoot’ on fleeing Iraqis in a state of disarray on the ‘highway of Death’?²⁶ Excessive firepower may have been used, well past the point of diminishing returns. The ‘turkey shoot’ was justified by some as necessary to destroy an enemy who might fight another day and who knew surrender was an option.²⁷ More disturbing explanations came from pilots who wanted to avenge fallen comrades or coalition prisoners of war paraded on Iraqi television. In some squadrons these sorties against fleeing Iraqi’s were known as ‘sport bombing’.²⁸

The operational commander has the responsibility for issuing humane Rules of Engagement (ROE) to his forces. ROE must be written in language the soldiers can clearly understand for it is for them, not lawyers or bureaucrats, it is written. ROE must be easy to use by soldiers and commanders but must never place forces at risk without adequate protection.²⁹ ROE must be clear on how to handle surrender and prisoners of war. Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that their troops know how to treat others with dignity and compassion.

Finally, commanders have a duty to treat the enemy humanely at war settlement conferences. The commander should treat the enemy leaders with respect and dignity. Why

smear their faces in the agony of defeat? General Schwarzkopf was clear in his decision to not embarrass or humiliate the Iraqi delegation at cease fire negotiations and the end of the war.³⁰ This demonstrated a strong sense of compassion; however, General Schwarzkopf's decision to permit Iraq uncontested use of helicopters for transport had unethical consequences. Iraq used the helicopters to crush the Kurdish rebellion in the North and the Shiite rebellion in the South.³¹

Wisdom. "The quality of being wise; power of judging rightly and following the soundest course of action, based on knowledge, experience, understanding, etc.; good judgment; sagacity". (Webster's New World)

Operational commanders must be students of history who have learned well the lessons of past wars and conflicts. Combining this knowledge with a morally sound value system allows the commander to make wise decisions concerning coalition, media, and war termination issues.

Coalitions are fragile and require a cogent command and control arrangement for unity of effort. The operational commander must take great care to respect cultural, religious and ethnic differences of the coalition forces. He must be sensitive to each nation's pride and military capabilities. General Schwarzkopf proved adept at bringing together successfully a coalition built from three dozen nations. His judicious handling of Saudi leadership allowed a parallel command and control structure that proved critical to the operation. Delegation of authority to General Khalid over the Joint Arab Task force assured Arab forces that their power was intact. This delegation of authority also insured that the Arab role would be one of substance (to include entering Kuwait City first). General Schwarzkopf's greatest coalition challenge was with the French who did not want to come under coalition command. Through his sensitivity to French self-importance, General

Schwarzkopf was able to establish entente with the French commander³² thereby increasing the anticipated force ratio.

The operational commander has an ethical responsibility to appropriately control media access. Media coverage is essential for positive world wide public support. The operational commander makes prudent decisions concerning what information falls into the 'need to know' category and what would aid the enemy. It is often necessary for the commander to withhold information available for security reasons. This is not a lapse in integrity but a synthesis of national integrity with wisdom to discern releasability of information. The commander must be proactive rather than reactive, especially concerning incidents of fratricide and collateral damage to noncombatants. General Schwarzkopf tried to balance his inclination to limit press access strictly with the reality that it would only increase resentment. He allowed the press information that he felt would be helpful for public support as well as for intimidation of the enemy. He has been criticized for overstating accuracy of smart bombs, refusing to discuss battlefield damage assessment and censorship of the media pools.³³

The commander has an ethical obligation to make wise decisions about war termination. If the military objectives are clearly stated, it would seem that war should terminate when those goals are achieved. The fog of war interferes with battlefield assessment making it difficult at times to ascertain when the objectives have been achieved. During the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf faced this dilemma when he received confirmation that coalition forces occupied Safwan when Iraqi forces actually held the area. General Schwarzkopf decided to take this territory even after the cease fire was in effect for he judged it operationally important.³⁴ General Schwarzkopf's decision to agree to a cease

fire when he did reflected his understanding of the theory of war as a political instrument. Once military objectives are achieved the diplomatic, political and economical instruments of power must be used. There is no need to further risk casualties on either side.³⁵ The debatable issue here is that the double envelopment had not been fully executed.

Moral courage. Moral-“Principles, standards or habits with respect to right or wrong in conduct; ethics”. Courage-“mind, purpose, spirit-the courage of one’s convictions; the courage to do what one thinks is right”. (Webster’s New World Dictionary)

The commander’s moral courage is the quality that allows synergy of commitment, integrity, humanity and wisdom in order to do the right thing, at the right time for the right reason. The commander makes decisions concerning the appropriate use of force to accomplish military objectives by judiciously weighing the ways versus means. The decisions on how to discriminately use military technology proportionately are made with one eye to the safety of his troops and the other eye toward mission accomplishment. The proper ordering of the fidelities to high principles, mission accomplishment and the welfare of one’s subordinates assists the commander in making these judgments. In time of war, loyalty to people cannot supersede the principles that represent why the people exist. The operational commander must make prudent decisions that will allow these concepts to be mutually nourishing.³⁶

Operational commanders have the Herculean task of avoiding a “loyalty dilemma”. This dilemma resolves around the issue of who should get the highest loyalty. “Loyalty to constitutional principles, loyalty to a government, loyalty to a service, loyalty to a boss - all these depend for their beginning and their end upon a well formed conscience”.³⁷ Misplaced loyalties can result in parochialism, excessive interservice rivalries and an unclear picture at the national-strategic level. Any one of these will court disaster for the operation.

The commander must never forget that military success paves the road to success of the political goals.

Parochialism can take the form of favoritism toward specific people or a specific branch of service. Commanders must be able to objectively evaluate the mistakes made by subordinate commanders. The prudent commander possesses the moral fortitude to stand behind those who made an error but did not let it result in a mistake. This same commander must also possess the ability to relieve someone guilty of negligence or incompetence. General Schwarzkopf did not always take the time to determine why his commanders made the decisions they did before threatening to have them relieved.³⁸

Having learned the lessons of Vietnam, Grenada and Iranian hostage rescue attempt, General Schwarzkopf refused to accommodate the parochial wishes of a single service at the expense of the operation or lives of the troops. He made decisions that best led to accomplishment of the task while reducing the risk of casualties. General Schwarzkopf's decisions to allow the 101st Airborne to parachute into the Euphrates river valley and not allow the Navy and Marine team to go forward with the amphibious landing at Kuwait's Faylakah Island³⁹ are evidence of his moral conviction to protect his troops against unnecessary endangerment.

Interservice rivalries have existed since there has been more than one branch of the military. The operational commander has the task of tempering the rivalries in order to maximize combat power. In the Gulf war subordination of authority for the conduct of the air war to US Air Force leaders created animosity among the other contributing services. The Army and Marine commanders expressed concern that the air commanders were overkilling the strategic targets and ignoring the enemy forces that they would soon fight.⁴⁰ General

Boomer is known to have said “Who’s running the goddam war? Is it the Air force or the CINC? You’ve got to wonder?”⁴¹ The Navy resented the ROE written by the Air Force as it prevented participation in some air strikes. This decision reduced the risk of fratricide as some of the Navy planes lacked redundant IFF equipment. Everyone does not have to ‘play’ but when they do they need to ‘play well together’ through complementary service capabilities and force synergism. Ironically, one observation was that “In a curious way, Schwarzkopf’s temper also helped quell interservice squabbles by unifying natural rivals beneath a common fear.”⁴²

The commander is responsible for providing the national- strategic leadership with his best judgment to provide a clear picture of the military situation. General Schwarzkopf was wary of the leadership of higher headquarters.⁴³ His wariness did not prevent him from “speaking truth to power”⁴⁴ on more than one occasion. His diligent efforts to get enough troops for the war, his calling for a decision concerning a shift from defense to offense⁴⁵ and his resistance to being pressured into an early start of the ground war are further testimony to his moral courage when dealing with national-strategic leadership. The decision to end the ground war before the double envelopment had a chance to take full effect was one that General Schwarzkopf agreed to in order to limit any further casualties. In his mind the military objective of destruction of the enemy forces had been achieved.⁴⁶ If he had consulted with his subordinate commanders more thoroughly, he may not have given in to the concept of a “hundred hour war”.

CONCLUSION

The operational ethic of a commander consists of a number of qualities fundamental to allow ethical decision making. While purity of character is the ideal, it is imperative to remember that a commander operates in a less than ideal environment. Commanders make decisions which in their judgment are the most prudent to accomplish mission objectives. The fog and friction of war adds confusion to the decision making process. The commander must not allow this confusion to delay critical decision making. He must also not fear reprisal for unintentional harming of non-combatants or casualties which result from fratricide.

General Schwarzkopf, while not a paragon of the operational ethic, made decisions during the Gulf war that he believed to be ethical. His intent was to achieve the military objectives while minimizing the risk of coalition and non-combatant casualties. His commitment to constitutional principles and the theory of war as a political instrument was unimpeachable. He intended to fight humanely in all aspects of the war. By targeting Iraq's economic infrastructure he knew he risked short and long term effects on the civilian population. His intent was to create chaos and disunity among the enemy forces to allow for coalition success. General Schwarzkopf had the difficult task of fighting against a ruthless and inhumane enemy, Saddam Hussein. By weighing the ends and the means, he felt justified in his targeting decisions. His decisions about coalition command and control demonstrated the sensitivity and wisdom critical to an operational commander. The integrity he brought to the headquarters was forthright but his lack of self control in dealing with subordinate commanders affected their freedom of action. The moral courage he

demonstrated toward the national-strategic leadership was admirable and demonstrated his commitment to the mission vice personal glory.

General Schwarzkopf's decisions during the Persian Gulf War must be viewed realistically. One must remember that he still operated under the cloud of the "Vietnam Syndrome". Consider also the ruthless enemy he faced and the ever present political pressures. A critical view of General Schwarzkopf's behavior, specifically toward his subordinate commanders, at first blush places a seed of doubt about his ethical character. When measuring his performance against the qualities outlined in this paper, he generally conducted the war as ethically as possible..

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Persian Gulf War commanders were experienced veterans of the travesties of the Vietnam conflict. General Schwarzkopf and his subordinate commanders were committed to fighting the Gulf war ethically. How will future operational commanders achieve the operational ethic required for moral decision making?

1. Military services must recruit people who exhibit the potential if not already existing qualities that comprise the operational ethic. This will require recruiters who are ethically sensitive and who possess the ability to make an accurate assessment of character. There is no simple "character test" that can be administered. The services must place individuals of exemplary character in billets affecting all accession programs (i.e., recruiting, service academies and ROTC programs).
2. Military services must educate personnel on the operational ethic and how it applies to the decision making process. Ethics training is insufficient. Future commanders must be

students of history and be inoculated by the lessons from the past. Officers must be educated in the fact that operational decision making contains many ethical “gray” areas. This education must occur dynamically through an officer’s career beginning on their accession into the service.

3. Someone once said “There are no atheists in the foxhole.” Nor should there be any atheists in the headquarters. The best ethical educators in the military are the chaplains. The military must encourage their involvement in all levels of the service members’ educational experiences. Each headquarters should have a chaplain personally assigned to work directly with the operational commander.

NOTES

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² Clay T. Buckingham, "Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions", Parameters, Autumn 1985, 25.

³ James H. Toner, "Leadership, Community and Virtue", Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, 103

⁴ Sun Tzu, quoted in Barry R. McCaffrey, "Human Rights and the Commander", Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn, 1995, 11.

⁵ Christopher Jochnick and Roger Normand, "The Role of Law in the Gulf War: Protection of Civilians or Legitimation of Violence" in War and Its Consequences: Lessons from the Persian Gulf Conflict, eds. John O'Loughlin, Tom Mayer and Edward S. Greensberg (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 61.

⁶ Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991), 254.

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⁹ Cohen, 209.

¹⁰ Rick Atkinson., Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 89.

¹¹ Atkinson, 3.

¹² Jochnick, 70.

¹³ Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 42.

¹⁴ Cohen, 277.

¹⁵ Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), 150.

¹⁶ Craft, 37.

¹⁷ Atkinson, 67.

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²² Weigel, 288.

²³ Michael Walzer, "Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War" in But Was it Just: Reflections on the Morality of the Gulf War, ed. David E. Decasse (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 12.

²⁴ H. Jack Geiger, "Bomb Now, Die Later: The Consequences of Infrastructure Destruction for Iraqi Citizens in the Gulf War" in War and Its Consequences: Lessons from the Gulf Conflict, eds. John O'Loughlin, Tom Mayer and Edward S. Greenberg (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 57.

²⁵ Atkinson, 453.

²⁶ Weigel, 27.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Atkinson, 451.

²⁹ Barry R. McCaffrey, "Human Rights and the Commander", Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn, 1995, 13.

³⁰ H. Norman Schwarzkopf (with Peter Petre), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf-The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 474-490.

³¹ Weigel, 30.

³² Cohen, 218.

³³ Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Just War as Politics” in But Was it Just: Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, ed. David E. Decasse (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 50-51.

³⁴ Schwarzkopf, 474-490.

³⁵ Craft, 41.

³⁶ James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 152.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁸ Atkinson, 3.

³⁹ Cohen, 256.

⁴⁰ Atkinson, 216.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 338.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 72.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Alberto Coll, “Ethics and the Individual” Lecture U.S. Naval War College , Newport, RI, 12 November 1996.

⁴⁵ Cohen, 231.

⁴⁶ Schwarzkopf, 470.

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